Abstract This paper argues that many ethical issues in neuroeducational research cannot be appropriately addressed using the principles and guidance available in one of these areas alone, or by applying these in simple combination. Instead, interdisciplinary and public dialogue will be required to develop appropriate normative principles. In developing this argument, it examines neuroscientific and educational perspectives within three broad categories of ethical issue arising at the interface of cognitive neuroscience and education: issues regarding the carrying out of interdisciplinary research, the scrutiny and communication of findings and concepts, and the application of research and associated issues of policy likely to arise in the future. To help highlight the need for interdisciplinary and public discussion, we also report the opinions of a group of educators (comprising trainee teachers, teachers and head teachers) on the neuroeducational ethics of cognitive enhancing drugs, infant screening, genetic profiling and animal research.
Introduction
The last decade has seen something of a step change in efforts to bring cognitive neuroscience and education together in dialogue. These efforts include a supranational project on "Learning Sciences and Brain Research" by the OECD's Centre for Educational Research and Innovation (CERI) from 1999 to 2006) and the formation of the International Mind Brain and Education Society which launched its journal "Mind, Brain and Education" in 2007. This increase in activity may partly arise from anxieties over the "parallel world" of pseudo-neuroscience found in many schools. Many of these concepts are unscientific and educationally unhelpful and there is clearly a need for some serious "myth-busting". There is, however, a more positive reason why discussions are breaking out between neuroscience and education. Many ideas are now emerging from neuroscience that are authentically relevant to education. Neuroscience has helped identify "number sense" (a non-symbolic representation of quantity) as an important foundation of mathematical development and associated with a specific region of the brain called the intraparietal sulcus [1] . As we learn to count aloud, our number sense integrates with our early ability to exactly represent small numbers (1 to 4) to "bootstrap" our detailed understanding of number. Such insights have prompted an educational intervention yielding promising results [2] . In reading, children with developmental dyslexia have shown reduced activation in typical left hemisphere sites and atypical engagement of right hemisphere sites, with consequent educational interventions improving language outcomes and remediating these differences in neural activity [3] [4] [5] . Neuroscience is also shedding light in other areas of education, providing insight into the link between exercise and learning [6] , and prompting reexamination of teenage behaviour [7] . Moreover, it is often established scientists that are promoting neuroscience as having educational value (e.g. [8] [9] [10] ). Indeed, neuroscientists appear increasingly willing to speculate on the possible relevance of their work to "real world" learning, albeit from a vantage point on its peripheries. Such speculation often comes under the heading of "educational neuroscience"-or cognitive neuroscience with potential application in education. Accordingly, its research basis is characterised by the epistemology, methodology and aims of cognitive neuroscience. But, moving from speculation to application is not straightforward, since the educational value of insights from neuroscience rest on their integration with knowledge from more established educational perspectives. This process of integration may require additional research that is multimethod and multiperspective in its approach. This paper will first discuss how such "neuroeducational" research can be characterised and describe three broad categories of ethical concern that may be generated by this emerging field of enquiry. Taking each category in turn, it will review salient issues from both neuroscientific and educational ethical perspectives, highlighting where divergence may arise and those issues where fresh interdisciplinary and public dialogue will be needed to develop appropriate normative principles and ethical guidelines.
To illustrate the potential for discussion and debate amongst educators about some of the issues covered in this review, the findings of a survey of educators will be occasionally be drawn upon that was carried out between 2008 and 2010 in the UK [11] . The respondents to this survey comprised 100 participants across various stages in their educational career and specialising in the full range of curriculum areas (33 secondary school trainee teachers, 33 primary and secondary school teachers, and 34 primary and secondary school headteachers). In a brief oral presentation, a basic introduction was provided to the topics they were about to encounter in the survey. So, for example, to help participants answer questions about cognitive enhancing drugs, the initial presentation included some examples of these drugs (donepezil, modafinil) together with evidence for their effectiveness amongst healthy individuals. To support participants in answering questions about infant screening, information was provided about the potential effectiveness of using EEG for early detection of children who may later be at risk of developing dyslexia. Respondents were then issued with the survey in paper form, and asked to indicate with a pen their agreement with statements regarding ethical dilemmas related to cognitive enhancing drugs, infant screening, genetic profiling and animal research. The results of this survey are presented graphically in Appendix A. From informal comments made after the data was collected, it was clear that this was the first time that many of the participants had made contact with some of the topics presented in the survey. The survey may, therefore, only provide a sense of initial educational response to the issues raised. Nevertheless, the authors believe the results are helpful in demonstrating the range of views that may be encountered within the educational community and, therefore, the need for future interdisciplinary discussion as a basis for developing guidelines, and principles that enjoy broad acceptance. To avoid pre-empting the outcomes of such dialogue, no attempt is made to define these principles here.
Neuroeducational Research
Many questions will need to be addressed as we seek relationships between neural processes and complex situated learning environments. The construction of meaningful concepts will need to be founded on at least 3 types of evidence: biological, social 1 and experiential. One thing appears clear from the outset: a simple transmission model in which neuroscientists advise educators on their practice should never be expected to work. Since neuroscience cannot provide instant solutions for the classroom, research will be needed to bridge the gap between laboratory and classroom. To emphasise the key role of educational values and thinking in the design and execution of such a venture, workers at the University of Bristol have found themselves using the term "neuroeducational research" to describe such an enterprise [12] . For both scientists and educators, authentic coconstruction of concepts involves a considerable broadening of epistemological perspective, an understanding of different meanings for terms used in their everyday language (e.g. learning, meaning, attention, reward, etc) and an appreciation of each other's set of values and professional aims. The integration of neuroscientific concepts into education may require at least three different types of study: scientific laboratory-based studies that focus on developing scientific knowledge pertinent to educational questions, bridging studies that explore these concepts in more "real-world" educational environments, and practise-based studies that develop concepts into best practice that is communicable and transferable to practitioners (e.g. teachers). In contrast to such authentic interdisciplinary work, brief intellectual liaisons between education and neuroscience are unlikely to bear healthy fruit. (These flirtations may, indeed, spawn further neuromyth, often due to a lack of attention to the complex ways in which mind and brain are interlinked.) This interdisciplinary approach has resulted in researchers within the Neuroeducational Research Network at the University of Bristol (www.neuro educational.net) pursuing a radical combination of different methods to explore research questions. For example, to investigate learning games, they have used behavioural experiments in the laboratory [13] , discourse analysis of classroom-based learning [14] and functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging of participants brains combined with neurocomputational modelling [15] . Such an approach brings together ethical issues more usually encountered in the individual areas of neuroscience and education, whose ethical perspectives, it will be argued, differ.
In addition to the issues in constructing knowledge combining neuroscience and education, it will also be argued that there are important issues to consider when communicating this knowledge. There is an experimentally demonstrable "allure" of neuroscience, such that explanations featuring the brain are generally more satisfying, even if its role in the explanation is meaningless. This may be one reason why neuromyths have proliferated within schools, and why communications to educators about the brain require careful crafting and scrutiny. The potential for educators to hold inappropriate ideas about the brain has dominated so many debates about the role of the brain in education and exercised so much concern, that it deserves special consideration. Finally, whatever neuroeducational research determines as possible, and however well its ethical processes and communications are policed, neuroscience and neuroeducational research will, directly or indirectly, provide challenging issues for educational policymakers. This consideration of the ethics of neuroeducational research will, therefore, focus on three areas: i) Conducting research at the interface of cognitive neuroscience and education ii) Scrutinizing and communicating findings and messages iii) Issues of policy involving novel ethical considerations likely to arise in the future
Conducting Research at the Interface of Cognitive Neuroscience and Education
These two fields have perspectives on research ethics that often overlap, but guidelines also reveal some distinct differences in terms of emphasis. A commonsense approach for projects spanning these two fields might be to ensure procedures are subject to safeguards recommended by both fields, but this combination is not necessarily straightforward. Even if we merely borrow neuroscientific techniques to answer educational questions, we cannot simply transfer the usual neuroscientific procedures along with the technology. One reason for this is that ethical review considers the risk-benefit ratio, and there may some difficulties in equating educational risks and benefits with those in other disciplines. Neuroscience and education experts tend to consider different types of risk and benefit. Educational research often includes social consequence as a research focus in itself, and so it is natural that researchers here are wary of their own involvement contributing to unwanted social phenomena such as bullying or friendship difficulties due, for example, to procedures that highlight individual difference. Educators, therefore, have some basis for claiming greater awareness of some types of risk, such as negative social consequences. On the other hand, physical safety is rarely an issue in educational research, and yet it is frequently the major focus for researchers making physiological measurements. Thus, the ethical guidelines of education and the sciences of brain and mind express many of the same principles, such as the desirability of anonymity and the need to balance risk and benefit, but the arguments may be characterised by different levels of emphasis in different areas of concern. The justifiable sensitivity of educational researchers to social risk, and the need to ensure physical safety during neuroscientific experimental procedures, makes neuroeducational research an interesting context for ethical scrutiny which is not yet covered by any one set of guidelines. In order to explore these differences in ethical perspective more carefully, and consider what implications these may have for the procedures followed by researchers, there now follows a review of some specific issues regarding ethical procedures.
Physical Risk
Most neuroimaging techniques can present some level of physical risk, however small. For example, MRI is a safe process for the majority of people, but it can be dangerous if the participant has metal within or on their persons. Screening procedures are essential to avoid serious injuries, with failure in this area accounting for most MRI injuries and the very few fatalities that have occurred [16] . No physical injuries are thought to have resulted from exposure to the strong static and pulsed gradient magnetic fields used by fMRI, and/or the radiofrequency fields involved. However, as a precaution, experimental participants are not normally scanned if they are pregnant, or think they might be.
Indirect physical risk is referred to in the UK educational ethical guidelines. Here, researchers are reminded to "avoid choices that in themselves have undesirable effects", such as offering "cigarettes to young offenders or sweets to school-children" [17] . It is interesting to compare this type of consideration with those of cognitive neuroscientists. There are no known effects of MRI scanning on the human embryo, yet participants who are pregnant are often screened out of experiments. Given the welldocumented effects of smoking on health, and sugar on teeth, it could be argued scientists' levels of concern for the well-being of their participants is no less than educational researchers'. In terms of physical risk, then, the ethical perspectives of neuroscience and education promote similar levels of attentiveness to the safety and well being of research participants.
Psychological Risk
Participants in fMRI experiments must lie in a small bore tube, sometimes for over an hour, wearing ear protection, with their head restrained and experiencing a very restricted visual field. This is a potentially claustrophobic environment that sometimes causes fear, anxiety and distress. Participants may not be fully aware of the scanning procedures and environment when first consenting to participate and they may feel awkward about expressing their anxiety and/ or desire to withdraw. Of course, present ethical guidelines emphasise participants' right to withdraw at any time without explanation. Yet participants' awareness of the time, effort and money that has been invested can create a pressure on them to continue. Part of the solution may be simulation in a mock fMRI scanner. This can provide a cheap way for participants to become more informed about fMRI procedures before committing to the real thing. It can also reduce psychological risk by helping acclimatize participants.
fMRI examinations are often accompanied by anatomical scans that can throw up unexpected incidental findings. In a review of 151 MRI studies involving adults displaying no other neurological symptoms, it was found that an average of 6.6% of participants had required medical referral [18] . The decision to suggest to a participant that they may benefit from medical referral can be difficult. The researcher must decide whether, often without radiological training, they should inform the participant (or their GP) that they have detected possible anomaly, undoubtedly causing alarm. This action could, in retrospect, be seen as needless or, possibly even lifesaving. Alternatively, they may decide the issue is not worthy of attention and hope their participant continues to enjoy good health. Guidelines for incidental findings are now becoming more developed. A recent multidisciplinary appraisal proposes researchers should not disclose abnormal findings unlikely to affect a participant's health [19] . Participants should, prior to the research being undertaken, be asked if they wish to be informed regarding i) non-fatal but serious abnormalities (even if no intervention is possible) and/or ii) life-threatening and grave abnormalities. In practice, however, implementation may still rely on the ability of researchers (who are not trained radiologists) to spot something that should be regarded as suspicious, before radiologists and clinicians become involved. The use of fMRI and other imaging techniques to address educational questions does, therefore, carry additional psychological risks to be weighed up against potential educational benefits. The involvement of children in scanning can add to these risks (see below).
Social and Educational Risk
It is perhaps in the realm of social risk that the views of educational researchers may depart most from those of colleagues in the natural sciences. Social scientists tend be acutely aware of the power difference that can exist between researchers and their participants, and how this can create ethical concerns and influence outcomes. Increasingly, educators have sought ways in which to empower the research participant, often with the explicit aim of ensuring that their voice is heard in the process and in the reporting.
Thus, when UK educational researchers seek informed consent, they ensure participants understand "the process in which they are to be engaged, including why their participation is necessary…" (italics are author's). This differs even from UK psychological guidelines that require participants to understand only the "nature, purpose, and anticipated consequences" of their involvement [20] (or, for that matter, U.S. educational guidelines that speak only of informing participants of the aims of the research [21] ). But, if young adults are participating in a neuroimaging study, to what extent can information about the process of the research be effectively provided? Do they need to know about the preprocessing of image data (e.g. that their image data will be combined with those of others), do they need to know that a method of contrasts is being used (that data from two conditions will be subtracted), what hypotheses are being tested-and whether outcomes will be statistically tested in terms of the participant group and/or in terms of the general population? In recent educational research, participants are often provided with information about the process in order to empower their voice as a valid source of data within that process. But what level of understanding would be required for participants to contribute their own reflections about neurological processes? It could be argued that participation in neuroeducational research can lead to a disempowerment of the learner's voice, due partly to the complexity of the research processes in which he/she is involved and partly to the traditional scientific paradigms and styles of reporting that usually omit such considerations. Neuroeducational researchers drawing on biological perspectives should feel no less committed in empowering their participants to understand and contribute to the research process, but they may have to struggle harder to achieve this than colleagues using more conventional educational research methods.
The active involvement of participants in educational research may, indeed, be more justified if it involves neuroscience. In his discussion of neuroethics, Leshner argues that one reason neuroscience creates special ethical issues is because the "..decision to alter brain structure or activity in any way involves potentially great cost-benefit tradeoffs that can go far beyond the specific intent of the intervention" [22] . Leshner goes on to discuss drug-addicts and those with 'disordered brains' yet his argument might be equally applied to educational interventions, since we now have examples of even brief training programmes producing changes in brain structure and activity [3, 23] . There may, of course, be no need for undue panic, since on this basis educators have been influencing the brain for decades using their own, well-developed ethical frameworks without consideration of neuroethics. In further emphasising the ethically problematic nature of neuroscience, Leshner goes on to point out "modifying the brain in any way has the potential to alter one's essential being". Again, "Education" could easily be substituted for 'the brain' in this sentence, and perhaps educational research has a longer history of considering the ethical dimensions of 'transformative' interventions. However, the potential significance of Leshner's point for neuroeducational initiatives, should not be dismissed lightly. Interventions with a strong neural basis can give rise to less freely-willed involvement of participants than other types of educational intervention, if only because neuroscience appears less capable of reflecting on concepts such as free-will. For example, as a leading expert on the adolescent brain, Paus believes that "the time is right for evidence-based, large-scale studies of interventions aimed at facilitating youth development. Neuroimaging-based approaches hold considerable promise, providing both the evidence as well as novel insights about the role of the environment in shaping the adolescent brain" [24] . However, given the emphasis on neuroscientific evidence, do such beliefs reflect an awareness of the considerable ethical issues of such interventions? How, for example, would participants negotiate what parts of their adolescent brain they would like 'shaped'? Neuroimaging studies of interventions aimed at remediation of reading difficulty have already been carried out, but remediation of character (one of the five "c"s of positive youth development [25] discussed by Paus in his article) suggests interference with outcomes closely allied with identity.
Conflict between ethical perspectives may also arise when carrying out bridging studies. Usually, studies of behaviour are tightly controlled in order to support scientific validity, and may consist of comparing two or more types of condition. In a study of learning in the classroom, this might mean comparing students' learning with and without an intervention. Within-participant designs, in which each participant experiences all conditions, are notoriously difficult when studying processes involving learning, due to transfer of what is learnt from the first condition to the second. Bridging studies may, therefore, benefit from between-group research designs in which learning outcomes are compared between an (experimental) group who has experienced an intervention and a (control) group who has not. These are similar to the Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs) that constitute an established method of medical science for comparing alternative interventions. However, in education, since they involve randomly assigning learners to different groups, such designs are often disruptive of normal school routines and are difficult to organise for the researcher. This makes it more difficult to justify proceeding with such research unless there are good grounds for already believing the intervention should work. The ethical problem then, of course, is why the control group should be denied the assumed benefits of the intervention [26] . In medicine, this dilemma is no less great, yet RCTs appear culturally more acceptable than in education, where such designs are less common. Indeed, UK educational research guidelines clearly state that steps should be taken to "minimize the effects of designs that advantage one group of participants over other e.g. in an experimental or quasi-experimental study in which the treatment is viewed as a desirable intervention and which by definition in not available to the control or comparison group respectively". Effects could be minimized by ensuring that the control group receives the intervention at a later date, although given school constraints on curriculum time, this may still disadvantage this set of students if they have to repeat a topic. Yet, when a developmental disorder and psychoactive drugs are involved, as in a study of the benefits of methylphenidate for children diagnosed with ADHD, RCT designs are considered appropriate and schools actively participate in them [27] . Differences in potential risks and benefits of educational and pharmaceutical interventions may explain how the intensity of the debate can vary, but not how two contrasting sets of attitudes have come to prevail in these two fields of enquiry. It has been pointed out that the basic ethical dilemma are similar, whether trialling methylphenidate or an educational intervention [28] . Thus, despite sharing similar underlying principles of respect for the human condition, there appear to be cultural differences between the different ethical perspectives that may be used to guide neuroeducational research, suggesting there is a need to develop an acceptable ethical framework that specifically applies to such work.
The Involvement of Children in Research
Neuroimaging procedures have been used in paediatric clinical contexts for many years. The need to understand more about normal development, not least as a source of insight into abnormal development, is now producing studies more closely related to mainstream educational aims. The development of neuroeducational research as an established field of enquiry will undoubtedly lead to greater numbers of imaging studies involving children. However, the procedures for children's participation in neuroimaging experiments are far from established. Guidelines for MRI scanning in paediatric clinical settings are emerging but the procedures here are likely to differ from those used by neuroeducational researchers. Paediatric clinical procedures can include features such as sedation (in order to reduce movement). This becomes less acceptable in experimental research whose outcomes are less promising in terms of immediate benefit to the individual, and they are wholly inappropriate in educational research. Another area of concern is safety screening (i.e. for the presence of metal). The standard screening procedures currently available are for adults, and a need has been identified for guidelines and procedures to be developed for children and their parents [29] . Even when an appropriate level of language has been used in these procedures, the disclosure by children of personal information (tattoos, piercings, pregnancy, etc) can involve researchers in highly sensitive situations. Indeed, the role of parent and child throughout the research process, in terms of their presence, their contribution in meetings and their involvement in decision-making, requires careful consideration. Also, although the magnetic fields used in MRI are assumed to be safe with adults, less is known of the effects of such fields on the developing brain and this suggests the need for additional caution. Incidental findings can also be a cause of particular distress for children and their parents, and these are not unusual, although usually without medical implication. In a retrospective review of 225 conventional paediatric MRI scans, referral rates were higher than those previously reported in the general population. Incidental abnormalities were detected in 21% of instances (with 17 requiring clinical referral and 1 urgent referral). Based on these results, the reviewers suggest there is an ethical case for MRI research involving children to always involve a trained radiologist [30] . Abnormal findings most usually require no referral but may, nevertheless, provide anxiety, particularly in school age children and teenagers, who may simply be concerned that something in their brain deviates from what others perceive as "normal" [31] .
UK educational research guidelines point to Articles 3 and 12 of the UN convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 3 requires that, in all actions concerning children, the best interests of the child must be the primary consideration [17] . That means any additional risk created by participation in research is unacceptable. Even so, however, the issues are still not straightforward. For example, this could provide an argument against participation in fMRI aimed at long term benefits to the general population, simply on the basis of psychological risk of stress caused by incidental findings. On the other hand, such an argument might be defeated on the basis that such incidental findings might also protect the child's health. Article 12 requires that children who are capable of forming their own views should be granted the right to express their views freely in all matters affecting them, commensurate with their age and maturity. This has fed into the growing appreciation of the need for children to be more fully involved in decision-making in matters affecting them at school [32] and this may include the research activity in which they participate. Consultation with children about research outcomes and their implications may become an important part of the neuroeducational research process, despite the additional challenge of ensuring that children's participation is informed.
Animal Research
In-vivo imaging techniques now form the basis of most research relating to brain function and human learning. However, at cellular and chemical levels, much of what we know about the brain basis of learning derives from experiments with animals that usually involve their destruction. Feelings can run high about this type of experimentation. In 2004, it was actions and protests by a minority that caused the scrapping of plans for the Cambridge Primate Centre, which was to have been a major centre of UK research into human brain disease [33] . The degree of controversy generated by animal experimentation is influenced by many different factors, including the type of animal involved. Around 55-70% of people support the use of small rodents, but the involvement of dogs, cats and nonhuman primates reduces this figure to 32-55% [34] . The type of research being undertaken also influences the acceptability of using animals. For example, acceptance appears to be stronger for using animals in medical research than in psychological research, even though the involvement and overall aims may be similar [35] . How then, might the involvement of animals in neuroeducational research be viewed? In our survey, educators showed divided opinions, with 45% considering that animal experimentation should sometimes be carried out in order to address educational research questions, but with 42% disagreeing with this.
Using information derived from animal research (including research carried out for other, e.g. medical, reasons) can promote its value and add to the case for using such methods. In that sense, simply using the results of such research to inform educational innovation could be viewed as an ethical decision in itself. In our survey of educators, 29% felt that understanding about the brain derived from animal experimentation should not be used to inform educational understanding.
Scrutinizing and Communicating Findings and Messages
Educational interest in neuroscience has helped spawn a number of neuromyths and unhelpful ideas that, at least, waste money and time and, at worst, also result in poor teaching and learning. In the face of such history, the scrutiny of educational ideas involving the brain should be of major ethical concern. But, how should such ideas be scrutinised and who should be scrutinising them? The language and concepts of neuroscience and education are very different and even some basic terms such as "learning" mean different things when used in an educational or neuroscientific context. It cannot be assumed, therefore, that separate scrutiny by educational and scientific experts working in isolation from each other will always be sufficient. It is likely that the more innovative and valuable ideas will rest on how judiciously concepts from both disciplines have been integrated. Neither type of expert may feel comfortable making that judgement, if they lack understanding of the other field. Until sufficient professionals exist with expertise in both areas, successful scrutiny may rest on dialogue between expert reviewers in dedicated interdisciplinary forums able to consider social and educational implications. Lang [36] has argued that the basis for such a dialogue should include transparency about the "ideology" of the perspectives involved. He draws attention to the popular notion that science can be value neutral and that this may, indeed, be a key feature of its attractiveness that contributes to its authority. In this way, Lang suggests that the very quality that helps preserve the authority of neuroscience can limit the dialogue required to weigh up its value and meaning in educational application and, thus, its usefulness.
In some practical respects, ethical concerns about communications of findings are similar in educational research and in the sciences of mind and brain. Guidelines in both fields emphasise the importance of accurate and honest reporting. However, guidelines for educational researchers usually make mention that communication should be in "clear, straightforward, and appropriate language to relevant research populations, institutional representatives, and other stakeholders" [21] . Good communication has been identified by teachers as a key factor in the successful educational application of concepts from neuroscience [37] . Teachers, who are usually short on time, require clear and concise information in non-specialist terms that can be conveniently accessed. This is a serious challenge for any research community, especially one competing with an established host of unscientific ideas promoted by commercial interests. In a survey of teacher's opinions about collaboration between neuroscience and education, one teacher put the problem bluntly:
"The neuroscientists...some of them have got a fantastic wealth of knowledge, but it's difficult for them to translate that knowledge...they're not gifted communicators always, whereas the snake oil sellers often are gifted communicators and they're the ones that the teachers pay to come and talk to them on their INSET [in-service training] days." (in [37] , p112) Quality of communication, including communication of complex concepts to non-specialists, must clearly be an ethical priority for neuroeducational researchers. Here, however, there is undoubtedly a fine line to walk between producing understandable prose with minimal technical language and oversimplifying a message until it becomes misleading. Appropriate communication of findings in academic and practitioner journals, but also in the wider community, can require anticipation of how ideas can become interpreted. For example, researchers have an ethical duty to ensure images of brain differences between different groups of children do not contribute to stigmatisation, lending unjustified weight to ideas of biological determinism and "broken brains", and influencing the attitudes of children, parents and teachers in unhelpful ways.
Agency is another area of deliberation preoccupying the new field of neuroethics, and of relevance in communicating ideas in neuroeductional research. Understanding about the processes of control and self-regulation in the brain is constantly feeding discussions about the extent to which neuroscience challenges concepts of free-will and voluntary decision making. The currently impoverished state of neuroscientific understanding in areas such as freewill has already been touched upon in this book, but the beginning of a movement to use such evidence in legal judgements has already begun [38] . In the U.S., neuroscientific evidence of brain maturation was provided by both sides in the case of Roper v. Simmons. Here, the question of whether 16-17 year olds found guilty of capital murder were sufficiently culpable to be executed was being considered. Morse reviewed the issues involved and concluded, prior to the outcome of the case, that the neuroscientific evidence alone could not decide such a question. In Roper v. Simmons, the court decided against the death penalty. However, as might have been predicted from Morse's review, the reasons provided by the Supreme Court in its judgement did not refer to any of the neuroscientific evidence that had been presented by both sides. It remains to be seen when, or if, new findings will be used to rekindle similar arguments in the future.
In educational domains, the inclusion of biological concepts can also threaten notions of agency. Here, however, it may already be influencing outcomes, if only through its potential for unfortunate and unjustified influence on teachers' and learners' attitudes. One example involves tentative insights about teenage behaviour based on emerging understanding of adolescent brain development. These have quickly become represented in public domains as deterministic, with headlines such as "Stroppy teenagers can blame their brain" [39] . Patience is a virtue, and probably ideas that help generate patience and tolerance of teenage behaviour might be helpful too. But at what point do such ideas relieve adolescents of responsibility for negative social behaviour? Unscientific communications that contribute to a diminished sense of agency amongst adolescent learners could be unhelpful for their development. Overly simplistic communications in the popular press may be unavoidable, but can be considered unethical if they arise from sources considered as expert.
Another example, in which teacher agency became an issue, was the public debate in the UK around dyslexia stirred up the television documentary "The Dyslexia Myth" [40] . Here, effectiveness of interventions that resembled the type of 'normal' remediation classes for poor readers was presented as evidence that dyslexia was a myth. The programme created a huge amount of controversy and discussion on blogs and web-sites, much of it quite emotional. However, in an article in "The Psychologist", Nicholson pointed out that that argument appeared to be that a 'true' disorder would not be remediated by such interventions, as if a 'true' disorder would need an intervention based on something other than good educational practice [41] . Clearly this conflicts with what we know about the plasticity of the brain, but such arguments can significantly influence teachers' sense of agency in supporting children with developmental disorders. They also reflect the ease with which development disorders, which are increasingly being studied from biological perspectives, can take on a biologicallydetermined character in the minds of non-specialists that makes them appear less amenable to educational remediation. The documentary was criticised for promoting an "all-or-none" theorising amongst the public and the sense that an individual case was sufficient evidence to reach general conclusions about a disorder. Nicholson suggested that the incorporation of modern views on brain function into existing approaches is part of the solution for avoiding such misunderstandings and, certainly, such an unhelpful over-simplification of the facts would be unethical if produced by a neuroeducational researcher.
When the facts are not simple, managing discussions amongst non-specialists can appear daunting but excluding public discussion can no longer be considered a serious option in ethical issues of public concern. Increased involvement of biological perspectives in educational thinking and practice are likely to generate many such discussions. There may be several areas of knowledge around which the public feels uncomfortable, and may even prefer to know nothing about, such as the relationship between genes and educational attainment. However, as Leshner [22] points out, both complexity and public discomfort are arguments for working at public discussion, not for excluding it. Without an effective science-public partnership, the motives and values inherent in neuroeducational initiatives may become suspect, undermining the considerable benefits that may arise from this new, and therefore vulnerable, area of enterprise.
Whatever difficulties arise in attempting to communicate and discuss neuroscience in straightforward terms, there exists a clear argument that scientists should be involved in these efforts. Neuromyths often begin with some set of scientific concepts that are then misinterpreted or overinterpreted by nonspecialists ( [12] , p20-36). There is no-one better placed to police such erroneous interpretation than the scientists most closely associated with the concepts themselves. That places a clear moral duty on neuroscientists to engage in dialogue with education [42] . That duty, however, is quite different from expecting them to don an educational "hat" and be ready to make judgements about the educational suitability of supposedly brain-based ideas. That may be an unreasonable expectation that is, itself, ethically dubious. Indeed, Sheridan et al. warn that research combining neuroscience and education can easily suffer from what they call the "hat problem", i. e. that people often get into ethical trouble when they wear too many hats, or do too much switching between them [43] . They point to the example of the academic geneticist who accepts public funds for basic research and then creates a private biotechnology company that operates in secret and profits illegitimately from the research. The ethical problem arises because business and science have different goals, as do neuroscience and education. A neuroscientist may have met his/her scientific goals in providing new understanding of a particular brain system, but when donning an educators' hat to promote or deny its educational merit, they may fail to embody the values and standards of the hat they are now wearing. For example, a neuroscientist may be encouraged to comment on the potential educational significance of gender differences in their results. However, without being fully aware of the detrimental stereotypes prevailing in the classroom and current educational policy concerns around gender, accurate scientific facts can be set out in ways that reinforce such stereotypes and/or work against helpful policy. Statements such as "girls have generally smaller brains than boys", or even just "girls' and boys' brains are different" are technically correct but easily misinterpreted for their significance. Based on such considerations, Sheridan et al. make an ethical argument for the creation of a new type of professional-the "neuroeducator". Neuroeducators, they suggest, will assume a number of roles but all focused on issues interfacing neuroscience and education, thus minimising hat swapping by a range of different types of experts that each possess only partial knowledge of the area. Neuroeducators could anticipate and monitor how neurocognitive advances may influence education, helping to make recommendations on developing educational knowledge, practice and policy that includes such insights. Although not directly solving any of the ethical issues discussed here, Sheridan et al. lay out a strong case for the effectiveness of individual expertise in concepts bridging neuroscience and education, and this may be a more effective way to develop this area than continuing to rely on mixeddiscipline teams. However, they also accept that the creation of the "neuroeducator" may bring its own ethical challenges. Such professionals will naturally be drawn to the possibilities of involving neuroscience in educational solutions. With closer ties to education, they will be in a strong position to implement interventions in schools and their natural bias may result in a premature introduction of ideas. The development of clear ethical guidelines for neuroeducational research will still be essential and possibly more so, if education is to benefit from the professional "neuroeducator".
Issues of Policy Involving Novel Ethical Considerations Likely to Arise in the Future
Even when research is carried out with careful consideration to ethics, and its findings scrutinised and communicated ethically, it tells us only what could or might be done. It may indicate likely outcomes and perhaps some sense of their probability. Researchers will rarely go further and provide opinions of what should be generally done-this is left to policy makers who often foster and draw upon debate and consultation to help them make decisions. But who should be included in this dialogue and how? It might be argued that the public is not well educated enough to involve themselves in discussions about neuroscience, and such involvement may lead to outcomes that are uninformed. As we have seen, there may also be areas around which the public feel uncomfortable and less willing to engage, but avoiding public discussion risks distrust, further anxiety and conflict. As argued by Leshner in regard to neuroethics, it is far better to bring members of the public in early so that researchers can be made aware of public hopes and concerns, and ensure their research does not leave behind broader human values. In fostering a healthy science-public partnership, communication by the field itself, as discussed above, will be crucial. Such a partnership will enable government to tackle a range of policy issues that may arise in the future, some of which will be now be reviewed.
The potential policy issues are legion and might include decisions about curriculum (whether to focus more on developing basic cognitive function, whether to include understanding about the brain as an aid to developing study skills), scheduling (in the light of our emerging understanding of circadian rhythms and adolescent development) and futuristic possibilities involving brain-computer interfaces. However, in the new field of neuroethics, Farah suggests that issues which are new and imminent are more worthy of our attention than those which we are already familiar or only likely to arise in the distant future [44] . These are the criteria that will be applied here although, within neuro-educational research, the word "new" is interpreted here as novel within the educational arena. This is because ethical issues already examined within, say, a medical context may need reconsideration in terms of the unique set of priorities, practices and concerns that help characterise educational contexts. The following issues of potential political interest survive the criteria of being new and imminent:
Cognitive Enhancers
In the US, students are increasingly using prescription drugs in order to provide cognitive enhancement and thereby support their studies.
Usage varies widely from one university to the next, with an average figure of 6.9% of students indulging in non-medical use of prescription stimulants [45] . In another study, however, that surveyed 1811 students at a large Southeastern US university, 34% reported the illegal use of ADHD stimulants (e.g. methylphenidate), and these mostly to improve their cognitive function during periods of fatigue and stress [46] .
The production of new and stronger drugs for cognitive enhancement appears set to increase, mostly as a result of efforts to combat the effects of Alzheimer's disease. One such drug is donepezil (marketed as Aricept) that increases levels of acetylcholine (ACh). ACh is thought to modulate the rate at which neural connections adjust themselves when learning, with increases in ACh able to bring about increases in learning rate. Donepezil reduces cholinesterase that mops up ACh, thereby increasing levels of ACh and improving cognitive function, including memory, amongst those suffering from Alzheimers [47] . The potential value of this drug for others was demonstrated in a study that administered donepezil to healthy young adults for only 30 days, and revealed significant improvements in episodic memory performance [48] .
Scientists have been speaking out in positive terms about healthy individuals exploring the "new enhancement landscape" [49] . In a recent article in Nature, one group of scientists suggested that the growing demand for cognitive enhancement should be responded to, and that the response should begin by "rejecting the idea that enhancement is a dirty word" [50] . However, a modest UK consultation showed more ambivalence [51] , with concerns that included In our survey of educators, most (76%) felt that grades achieved with the help of cognitive enhancers should not be valued as highly as grades achieved without them, with 57% anticipating they would contribute to the educational effects of the poverty gap, but with 74% against them being made freely available. Most also felt (61%) that random drug testing should be introduced if the use of such drugs became popular.
The apparently divergent views of scientists and educators suggests public consensus on cognitive enhancers may be some time arriving. Policy makers will expect answers to arise out of public and professional debate, but the readiness with which they arrive, and the usefulness and value of these answers, may rest heavily on how that debate is managed and conducted. Even when discussions are formally organised, educators cannot assume they will have a voice in them. When the governments' Foresight Programme appointed stakeholders and experts to discuss how cognitive enhancers (or "cogs") might effect the UK, education was not represented. The 2005 consultative report predicted that cogs would start appearing in the UK around 2011 and, by 2017, might become "an acceptable part of the knowledge professional's tool kit" [52] . Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the background of those compiling it, the report failed to consider what this would mean for education.
Infant Screening with Neural Markers
Event-Related Potentials (ERPs) refer to a set of distinct electrical signals emitted by the brain and detectable using a non-invasive technique involving the attachment of electrodes to the scalp. Some ERP waveforms of newborn infants have been identified that can differentiate between children who will later, at 8 years old, be poor readers or have developed dyslexia [53] . Measurement of ERPs has been shown as an effective method of predicting dyslexia in new-borns with and without a family history of dyslexia [54] and such techniques could form the basis of very early screening, so that children at risk of dyslexia are able to benefit as quickly as possible from suitable intervention(s) (see also discussion by Friedrich of neural markers and specific language impairment [55] ). Such techniques and possibilities are not limited to literacy. Another type of ERP has been identified that is sensitive to children's response to numerical distance [56] that may be a helpful neural marker for magnitude processing in infancy. This signal may provide an early indicator of later educational risk in respect of mathematics.
The use of neural markers to provide very early detection of educational risk for dyslexia is an area identified by Goswami where a neuroscience approach may provide particular promise for education [57] However, when asked whether all infants should be screened for risk of dyslexia at the first opportunity, in order to allow early intervention, the educators in our survey were evenly divided, with both 42% for and 42% against the idea, and with 58% considering that infant screening would give rise to undesirable "labelling" of children.
Genetic Profiling
The area where genetic knowledge is first likely to impact, and appears likely to do so in the next 1-2 decades, is in the area of learning difficulties. Genebased diagnoses of potential learning difficulties will be able to predict general learning difficulty as well as difficulties within specific areas such as maths [58] . Such very early predictions, combined with emerging educational understanding of effective interventions, will provide the soonest possible implementation of appropriate help. Genetic knowledge will provide opportunities for new levels of personalised learning and these should ameliorate or even prevent the manifestation of some learning difficulties.
Ultimately, genetic knowledge should allow educational programmes to be better tailored to suit all individual genetic profiles. This wider application, however, will only add further controversy to a plethora of ethical issues and questions about using genetic knowledge in education: What may result when genetic testing proceeds without full understanding of the educational intervention required? Who makes the decisions about testing and interventions, and by what processes? What precautions are needed to prevent this new educational opportunity feeding demand for genetic engineering and eugenics?
Amongst the educators we surveyed, 42% thought the use of genetic information in education should be prevented, with a majority of 61% considering it unlikely that the use of genetic information in education could be controlled sufficiently to make it desirable.
The enthusiasm of many scientists for innovations such as cognitive enhancers, genetic profiling and infant screening appears at odds with the initial response of educators we surveyed. In some ways we appear on the verge of new world. By prescribing drugs and developing very early interventions on the basis of neural and genetic markers, we have the possibility of positively influencing outcomes in powerful and radical ways. Perhaps the response of educators appears somewhat churlish in the face of these unprecedented opportunities, and perhaps reflects an anti-science attitude amongst some educators. But Stein [59] suggests that science misunderstands the basic concern of educators. He articulates the issue as having, for the first time in history, the chance to "design" children rather than rear them. In designing a child, there is no need to make use of relationships built on communication, the child does not participate in shaping his/her life, but is acted on from the outside by processes beyond his/her control with results he/she cannot feel responsible for. Stein [59] points out that these scientific advances have created an unprecedented state of affairs: we can change the behaviour of a child without establishing shared goals or a situation of mutual understanding, overriding the child's emerging autonomy. Even when we issue a punishment, this is usually with a communicative intent, yet these new methods entirely go around the child's judgement and choice. The potential implications of this novel path are beyond the scope of this article, but clearly there is a need to consider these more carefully.
Conclusion
In terms of how their research is conducted, the communities of neuroscience and education share similar levels of sensitivity regarding physical safety. The use of neurophysiological measurement raises some new issues for educational researchers regarding psychological risk, specifically in the area of incidental findings. Here, helpful guidelines are emerging, although the psychological stress from being alerted to potentially abnormal findings is an issue when considering risk-benefit ratios in neuroeducational research contexts. Social risks, to which educators are especially sensitised, are likely to be a frequent focus of ethical discussion around neuroeducational research procedures. These concerns would include the extent to which participants are empowered to be involved and have their views represented, and issues around the use of control groups. The tendency for change in brain function and structure to be perceived as more fundamental than behavioural change (when, in fact, these two are intimately interrelated) may, rightly or wrongly, exacerbate such concerns. The involvement of children in research makes it particularly important that steps should be taken to avoid/ minimise all these types of risk, and presents additional challenges for those wishing to develop ethically sound protocols (e.g. in terms of facilitating fully informed consent and ensuring voice).
Given the ease with which unhelpful neuromyths have become popular and influential in schools, the quality with which findings are scrutinized and communicated to specialists and non-specialist audiences is likely to be a key ethical concern for the successful development of neuroeducational research. There is a need for researchers to thoughtfully anticipate and discourage misconceptions by nonspecialists (e.g., such as those involving agency).
Increased understanding and advances at the interface between neuroscience and education will rapidly give rise to a host of policy-making decisions with salient ethical dimensions (including cognitive enhancers, infant screening using neural markers, genetic profiling). Opinion may be divided on these issues between educators and scientists, as well as within their own communities. No single set of normative principles from the contributing disciplines can currently provide universal ethical guidance in this emerging area. The development of these principles and guidelines will require interdisciplinary discussion, with many issues demanding public consultation and debate. Given the extent to which the media focus their attention on both the brain and on schools, neuroeducational research is likely to generate considerable public interest and can be expected to have influence on the sciencepublic relationship. It is especially important, therefore, that neuroeducational researchers ensure their research proceeds in a manner sensitive to public hopes and concerns, and reflective of broad human values.
Appendix A
Results of a survey of educators (N=100) who were asked to express their agreement on statements relating to the neuroeducational ethics of cognitive enhancing drugs, infant screening, genetic profiling and animal research
